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I. INTRODUCTION
The following is a report on progress made during a full
year of work on NASA Contract No. NASW-2236, whose subject is the
development of a "robot" computer problem solving system. We
will begin with a brief summary of just what we mean by "robot"
computer problem solving> and why we chose to study it.
A. The Nature of "Robot" Problem Solving
There have been a number of computer problem solving systems
developed in the past, but most of these have been concerned with
purely "mental" problems such as playing chess. These problem
solvers do not necessarily work efficiently when presented with
"physical" problems of the sort faced by a living animal or by
an artificial animal ("robot") moving about in a complex environ-
ment. The reason is that interaction with a real environment
involves several fundamental constraints that are not present in
the abstract problem solving situation. Below we will give four
major characteristics of the robot situation, and contrast them
with the constraints on a purely "mental" problem solver.
(1) Richness of information
The predominant characteristic of the real world is that it
contains far more information than any robot system can ever
cope with all at once. There will always be many details of any
situation that the robot does not have time to attend to, and
there will always be regions around it that it does not have
time to explore. This situation contrasts very sharply with a
situation such as in chess, where the problem solving system has
available to it dll the information that is khowable about the
problem. Much of the design problem in robot intelligence
-1-
Report No. 2316 Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc,
involves mechanisms for obtaining and selecting the necessary
information in any situation from the flood of irrelevant infor-
mation that surrounds the system.
(2) Uncertainty
A robot must always cope with uncertainty in everything it
plans or does. It is uncertain of what it "knows", because the
world may change, or the robot may have incorrectly identified
the situation it is in. The robot cannot even be certain of the
consequences of its actions: it may think it is picking up an
object, when actually the object has fallen out of its grip.
The chess-playing program, again, has infallible knowledge of
all that is true in its little world, and all of its actions are
guaranteed to have the intended result. Thus, a "robot" problem
solving system must overcome obstacles to its performance that
are totally absent in a "mental" problem solving system.
(3) Interaction
Because of the richness and uncertainty of its world, the
robot depends on continual interaction with the world in order
to update its knowledge.—This is especially important in that
it allows the robot to become aware of totally unexpected situa-
tions (e.g. an object in its path) that may interfere with or
aid its plans. By contrast, chess-playing programs do not act-
ually interact with their opponents; instead, they treat each
new board-position as a totally new abstract problem. There is
no need to seek information from the board, and no chance of
anything utterly unexpected occurring. Indeed, the "mental"
problem solving system lacks a whole mode of behavior,-namely
control of action by feedback, that is vital to the operation
of any robot system.
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(4) Commitment
In order to accomplish anything, a robot system must actual-
ly commit itself to action. But whenever it acts, it is taking
a risk; for example, if it moves forward it might fall into a
hole, or hit some obstacle, or crush something of value. Of
course, the chess-playing program must eventually commit itself
to a move, but during the course of the problem solving operation
itself, it makes all trial moves "in its head", and it can men-
tally take back any move that turns out to have unfavorable re-
sults. The robot does not have the luxury of conducting all its
problem solving "in its head". For example, in order to gain
enough information to come to a decision, it may have to operate
a sensory device, or move an object, or move itself, all of which
involve risks. Thus, the robot must take the risk of making real
actions, even within the process of deciding whether to commit
itself to other actions.
Because the task of a real-world robot has special con-
straints such as those just discussed, we felt that we should
start from scratch in designing a problem solving system that
would meet these special problems — what we call a "robot"
problem solving system. Accordingly, we programmed a simulated
robot and a "simulated real world" that possess the fundamental
informational properties of a real robot situation, but which
bypass the many technical problems of actual hardware systems.
This simulation proved to be simple enough to give us some
theoretical insights into the nature of robot problem solving,
while at the same time being complex enough to serve as a
challenging task environment within which to construct experi-
mental problem solving systems.
-3-
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B
* Contents of the Report
In terms of the simulated robot, our final achievement in
this year of work is a system which can visually scan its envi-
ronment and create an internal model of it, this being done in
an informationally efficient manner (e.g., unusual objects
receive more attention than commonplace ones, but no particular
object monopolizes the robot's attention for long). Developmen-
tally, we would have to rate the robot's behavior somewhat below
that of a three-week-old kitten; but this is actually no small
accomplishment, nor was it trivially achieved.
More important than the particular performance of our simu-.
lation is the theoretical understanding that we have gained in
the course of working with it. The simulation model itself has
no practical value, but it has given us experience with problems
that must be faced in any robot system. In this report we have
tried to emphasize the general principles that seem to underlie
!
each particular problem.
This report is in fact organized so as to proceed from the
specific to the general. Section II discusses the programming
systems that we have used in constructing the problem solving
system. Section III describes the simulated robot and its
simulated world environment. Secion IV presents the experimental
problem solving system at its present state of development, and
analyzes the tasks that it is capable of performing. Section V
sets forth some of the important problems that have not yet been
dealt with in the current system. And Section VI outlines a very
general framework for understanding the relationship between an
observed behavior and an adequate description of that behavior.
-4-
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II. PROGRAMMING SYSTEMS
If we had outlined this report a year ago, we would not even
have included a section on programming systems. We are no longer
so naive. When a theory is embodied in a computer program, the
language in which the program is written takes on a direct theo-
retical significance. This assertion is supported both by our
actual experience and by theoretical considerations (Section VI)
concerning the manner.in which behavioral systems are best de-
scribed.
A. General vs. Special-Purpose Systems
There is a well-recognized trade-off between the flexibility
of general-purpose programming systems and the ease of expression
in special-purpose ones. Because the purpose of our investiga-
tion was to experiment with executive systems themselves (that
is, problem solving executives for the robot), we chose to use
one of the most flexible programming systems available, BBN LISP.
We have occasionally been asked why we did not use the recently-
touted PLANNER system developed at MIT. The reason is simply
that PLANNER imposes a bias toward certain forms of program
organization, and such a bias would be unhelpful or even anti-
thetical to experimentation with various executive organizations.
The complete generality of BBN LISP, while necessary for
our purposes, often proved to be burdensome in practice. This
was especially true with respect to the absence of special data-
structure types in LISP to correspond to the types of entities
that we were creating in our model. To alleviate this problem,
-5-
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we implemented a "formatting" package that provides the following
facilities:
(1) When the user defines the "format" of a data-type, the
names of its sub-parts automatically become defined as accessing
functions. For instance, suppose a STATE is defined as
(CONDITIONS TIME) — that is, as a list of conditions and a time.
Then, if S4 is the name of a particular state, (TIME S4) will
return the TIME part of S4. Different data-types can have the
same sub-part names without confusion arising.
(2) The user can easily print selected parts of a data-type
in a tree format. For example, the state S4 can be printed,
among other ways, in the form:
S4 CONDITIONS (Cl & & &)
(C2 & & &)
(C3 & & &)
TIME 37.4
—where the ampersands indicate deeper list structures. Here
the format of a data-type serves as a "grammar" for it, and the
above sort of printout~may be regarded as a selective "parsing"
of the structure, presented in a very legible tree form.
(3) Formats can be changed at will, and data-structures
can be reformatted in accordance with such changes. For example,
if the sub-part TIME were eliminated from the prototype format
for STATE, then a single function could be called which would
eliminate the .TIME sub-part from all particular states such
as S4.
-6-
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B. Temporal .Organizations
There is a significant respect in which BBN LISP is not
general-purpose, and this aspect of the LISP system has given us
a good deal of trouble. This is simply the sequential, step-at-
a-time, start-to-finish form of process execution that LISP
shares with most other programming systems. In simulating the
relationship between a perceiving, problem-solving robot and its
environment, we often need to specify complex" temporal interre-
lationships that are very cumbersome to express in LISP.
The most obvious case of a difficult temporal relationship
is that of simultaneity. This important relationship can of
course only be simulated on a serial computer. We have realized
belatedly that there are several ways of performing such a simu-
lation. One way is to establish a "clock time" (either simulated
or real), and alternate computation among each of several pro-
cesses, running each of them for a definite quantum of time.
Another method (which is the one that we have actually employed)
is to run each computation until it produces some sort of result,
and then note how much clock time that computation took. A
third possibility, which is a more elegant extension of the last,
is to run each process a convenient distance into the "future",
keeping a record of the results that it will produce at various
future times, and then to advance the clock and simply read the
inputs for that time-quantum off of the pre-computed records.
The latter method has the advantage that computations can be run
arbitrarily long until they hit logical break points; it has the
disadvantage that some "future" results may have to be recomputed
if there is too much interdependence among the various simultane-
ous processes.
-7-
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An important variant on simultaneity is the notion of a
"demon", a process which can go into a "dormant" state but which
is set to "wake up" when some condition is fulfilled. It seems
that many animal-like behaviors are very efficiently described
in terms of demons (see Sections IV.E.2.B and VI.G), so it is
important that there be a convenient way of programming them,
even if there is no efficient way of implementing them on today's
computers. Another related but more general concept is that of
an "interrupt", which implies the active intervention of one
process into another's computation. This notion appears to be
indispensable in simulating the attention-shifting mechanisms
which allow animals (and robots) to cope with the unexpected in
real world environments.
As mentioned above, we have employed inelegant means to
simulate simultaneous processing. We spent a bit of time devising
a programming language for demons, but it was too clumsy in both
form and execution to be of use. So, we have provided for inter-
rupting processes by ad hoc means when the necessity has arisen.
Clearly we are in need of programming (and computing) aids that
will allow us efficiently to create temporal organizations that
exceed the strict serialism of most present systems. Of course,
various forms of multi-processing and even multi-computer organi-
zation are indeed becoming popular areas of investigation, often
with a view to performing numerical calculations more efficiently.
What we wish to emphasize here is that these novel forms of
temporal organization, which are a luxury when applied to numeri-
cal calculations, may well be a necessity when it comes to creat-
ing the systems required for robot problem solving.
-8-
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C. Inhomogeneous Systems
In speaking of the need for special-purpose programming
facilities for creating robot problem solving systems, we should
realize that some parts of such systems are more special-purpose
than others. For example, the motor system in a robot, as in an
animal, must cope with problems that are peculiar to the physical
system that is being controlled; it would be pointless and inef-
ficient to design such a system at the same level of generality
as the problem solving executive. Indeed, any efficient large-
scale system must be organized as a hierarchy of increasingly
specific processes. In Section VI we discuss a number of theo-
retical problems created by such an organization. Here we will
merely mention the practical problem that an efficiently designed
system may require the use of several different special-purpose
programming systems, and that furthermore these systems must be
able to interact with each other in a coordinated way.
We have tried to avoid this problem by concentrating our
efforts on the executive level, while simplifying the other
levels such as the motor system down to the point of triviality.
We feel that this approach has weakened the validity of our.
simulation model; we now believe that the problems of inhomoge-
neity and coordination should be faced more forthrightly. To
\
our knowledge, the most impressive work on these problems to date
is exhibited in the Stanford Research Institute's hardware robot,
which successfully integrates systems in several different lan-
guages and even in different computers. This approach, while
fraught with problems, apparently mirrors the organization of
biological systems, and probably is the only efficient way of
obtaining life-like behavior from a mechanical system.
-9-
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III. THE SIMULATED ROBOT AND ITS WORLD
In order to have a definite problem space in which to study
the design of a robot problem solver, we have chosen to simulate
a two-dimensional environment which has the properties of a net-
work of city streets. The simulated robot is equipped with a
fairly complex visual system, with which it must scan its sur-
roundings, identify its location, and find its way from point to
point in the city network. In the first section below we will
simply describe this simulation model as it now exists. In
Section III.B we will consider some of the issues involved in
the selection of this particular model.
A. The Simulation Model
A.I. Components of the Model
The world that confronts the robot is composed out of street
sections that we may call "blocks", which are connected together
in a geometrical pattern, and objects which stand along the sides
of the streets. The objects are of three classes: buildings,
roadsigns, and stoplights.
Blocks may vary in length (although all blocks in the cur-
rent world have a length of 180 feet), and all blocks have the
same non-zero width (currently 20 feet). They may join at any
angle, and up to 8 blocks may join at a single intersection.
With each block is associated a speed limit and a "safe speed"
which is a single parameter incorporating such factors as number
of lanes, density of traffic, quality of road surface, etc. The
safe speed is always greater than or equal to the speed limit.
-10-
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Each object in the world has a point location along the
side of a block. It also has a list of visual features which
are appropriate to its type. Thus, a building has the features
HEIGHT, WIDTH, COLOR, TEXTURE, and DETAIL (the feature DETAIL is
intended to provide a unique feature for each building). A
roadsign has the features COLOR, SHAPE, and TEXT. A stoplight
has a COLOR feature which is computed specially as a function
of time.
The robot itself is represented by a set of variables that
describe its location, velocity, and the state of its sensori-
motor system. The driving system consists basically of an accel-
erator, brake and steering wheel. The sensory system consists
basically of a speedometer and a single eye. The eye has a
number of control parameters, which will be described in Section
III.A.4. The robot perceives space in terms of an internal co-
ordinate system described in Section III.A.5.
The world enforces a set of physical and (optionally)
traffic laws, described in Section III.A.3.
-11-
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A. 2. Layout of the First Experimental "City"
For our first simulated "city" in which to develop the robot
model, we have chosen a square that is two blocks on a side, as
sketched below:
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This square was chosen because it is the simplest layout satis-
fying the two criteria that: .
(a) The robot can return to a given place without
executing a u-turn, and
(b) The layout contains both straight and angular
intersections.
The first of these criteria relates to the problem of recognizing
a place on returning to it; the second relates simply to the
mechanics of stopping and turning at intersections.
The simulated world at present contains 44 buildings, 5
stoplights, 3 stopsigns, and 16 other signs. The scenery is
arranged in a varied way that is intended to test the kinds of
information-selection that the robot must make. For example, one
side of the square is a high-speed "superhighway" with a very
sparse population of buildings; one block is a "housing develop-
ment" , whose houses all look the same except for their pastel
colors.
We have made our initial "city" very simple because we feel
that there is no need to introduce complex problems such as path-
finding until we -have developed a sensori-motor system and an
experiential representation that will allow the robot to move
freely in this more restricted environment.
-13-
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A.3. Dynamics of the Robot
The robot can accelerate and decelerate within the bounds of
a maximum and minimum speed. The "steering wheel" setting deter-
mines the robot's angular velocity. It is permissible for the
robot to attain a large angular displacement with respect to the
road only if:
(1) The robot is near the end of a block, in which
case it progresses onto the succeeding block
determined by its angle (providing that there
is a succeeding block at that angle - otherwise
there is a crash), or
(2) The robot's forward speed is extremely small,
in which case it executes a u-turn.
If the robot attempts to turn the steering wheel in any
other circumstances, the result is a "crash", meaning a penalty
input that involves a loss of speed, a waste of time, and perhaps
a negative factor that may be said to simulate pain. For the
purposes of steering, it is as though the streets were bordered
with barrier walls: the robot can crash into the walls, but it
can never actually drive off the road.
The world is also capable of enforcing a set of traffic laws,
involving the running of red lights and stopsigns, speeding vio-
lations, and wrong-way travel on one-way streets (although there
are no one-way streets in the current model). Also, any of these
violations (plus exceeding the "safe speed") involves the risk
of a crash as well as the risk of a legal penalty. There is a
switch in the system which allows all of these hostile restric-
tions to be disabled, since in its early development the robot
-14-
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A.4. The Visual System
The robot's only highly-developed sensory organ is its lone
eye. The visual system has been made very elaborate and, hope-
fully, realistic, because it is the main tool in our study of
the relationship between sensory experience and problem solving.
The eye is capable of seeing objects which fall within an
area whose shape is shown in the figure below:
-16-
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The dimensions and placement of the visual field are determined
by four parameters: the radial and tangential coordinates of
the center point of the field, and the radial and tangential
widths of the field.
The visual field is divided both radially and tangentially
into thirds, and the central angular sector is divided again into
thirds, with the centermost ninth of the field representing fove-
al vision. The acuity of vision depends on the section of the
field in which the object falls. It also depends on the total
area of the visual field, such that the more tightly constricted
the field, the more acute is vision throughout the field.
It is this "acuity" factor which determines which visual
features of an object may be seen, because the successive fea-
tures of an object have increasing thresholds for perceptability.
Thus, the robot might see a building in a peripheral sub-field
and perceive its HEIGHT and WIDTH properties; then, by moving the
eye so as to bring the building into a more central sub-field, it
might sense the COLOR and perhaps the TEXTURE properties as well.
Or, it might gain greater acuity by narrowing down the field,
although there is the danger that a peripheral object might be
lost from view if this is not done carefully.
We feel that this ability of the visual system to pick up
successive features simulates an extremely important property of
all real perception, namely that in order to wrest a certain
amount of information from the world, the system must (1) exert
a certain amount of active effort, and (2) temporarily exclude
a certain amount of other information from consideration. This
is the basis of the mechanism of "focal attention", which we
-17-
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believe to be of utmost importance to a system that must cope
with an information-rich environment.
It has been noted that buildings, roadsigns, and stoplights
are treated as point-objects; they have no spatial properties.
In the robot's world, the lowest level of compound object is the
"place" — that is-, a spatial, con figuration of point-objects.
As far as our investigation is concerned, it does not matter at
all that buildings (which we normally think of as large) are
taken as primitives with point-locations. All that matters is
that the. world contains some sort of primitive sensory entities,
and some sort of compound entities built out of the primitive
ones.
At present, the robot can potentially see any object that
is on the block it is on, or on any succeeding block (providing
of course that the object falls within its visual field). Also,
if the robot is within 15 feet of the end of its block, it. can
see the intersection that follows the succeeding block. This
rule is partially a simulation of the fact that we can see far-
ther ..from an .inter section^ than jfrom the middle of a block, and
partially a concession to certain trigonometric difficulties.
We have not simulated the occlusion of one object by another, as
this simulation would be extremely expensive and not exception-
ally interesting. .
We have gone to a great deal of trouble to enable the robot
to see roads themselves, and to locate them within its Visual
field. This ability is clearly a necessity, since the only way
-18-
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that the robot can know where the road leads is by looking at it.
On the other hand, we have not given roads any identifying visual
features, because we want the robot to have to recognize them by
the constellation of objects along them, and not by intrinsic
properties.
Finally, we have set up an extremely primitive motor system
in which the input variable of the eye is its angular velocity
(with a typical value of 225°/sec). Since time is quantized
(currently in units of 0.2 sec), the act of moving the eye be-
comes one of setting it in motion and then monitoring its posi-
tion over several instants of time (by contrast, the focusing of
the eye is taken to be instantaneous). This feedback monitoring
of actions is of course interesting in itself, but we are even
more concerned with the interactions that arise between motor
activities and cognitive operations. For example, the system
can command an action and later, while the action is still in
progress, decide that it is not worthwhile and abandon it. This
sort of thing already happens in our present "looking around"
program, but we do not yet have a good general framework for
representing the time-course of actions.
-19-
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A.5. The Internal Coordinate System
The robot is able to sense the angular position of its eye,
independent of whatever visual sensations might be coming from
the eye. This is a reasonable provision, since any vertebrate
eye (or neck, for that matter) contains muscular-stretch recep-
tors which inform the brain as to where the eye is turned. For
our robot, we define seven different angular ranges, spaced 45°
apart, as shown in the following figure.
FORWARD
\
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We allow the visual field to have a maximum width of 120°.
When such a field is centered over one of the angular ranges,
the three equal sub-sectors of the visual field nearly coincide
with angular ranges (the figure below shows this with the eye
centered on range 0). The inexactness of this match is inten-
tional.
-21-
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If the robot first centers on range -2, then on range 0,
and then on range 2 (or in the reverse order), it will have
divided whatever objects are visible into approximately their
correct angular ranges. This procedure is obviously of great use
in "looking around" at a scene.
Note that the robot cannot turn its eye to the octant dir-
ectly behind it. This limitation of most animals need not apply
to mechanical robots, of course, but we have incorporated it in
our robot because it puts an interesting constraint on the infor-
mation-gathering processes. Also, this constraint results in
more human-like behavior (e.g. in the scan patterns produced by
the "looking around" procedure), which aids our intuition in
evaluating the correctness of the robot's routines.
We have also divided the robot's radial (distance) discrimi-
nation into seven ranges. These ranges are chosen to allow the
robot to cover the whole radial span of its vision with only
three "focus" settings, as shown in the following figure (recall
that the robot's visual field is divided radially into thirds).
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Therefore, the nine locations (-2,2), (-2,4), (-2,6), (0,2),
(0,4), (0,6), (2,2), (2,4), and (2,6) take on great significance
for "looking around" at all that is visible, as will be explained
in Section IV.D. These locations are mapped in the figure on the
previous page.
B. Discussion of the Simulation Model
The simulated city environment is made out of components
which were designed to allow easy extension or combination into
a new model. In fact, the system is capable of making a fairly
realistic model of a real city, even one as geometrically complex
as Boston. However, as indicated earlier, our simulated robot
has not yet reached the stage of development where we can expect
it to survive in the streets of Boston. There are many funda-
mental problems to be solved even in the case where the robot is
not moving at all, but simply looking around at its environment
and trying to record or recall its current location.
Along with being flexible, the simulation model is arbitrary
in many ways. 11_ was ^ designed to balance off criteria of real-
ism, computational efficiency, and theoretical validity. We tried
to give precedence wherever possible to theoretical validity, by
which we mean that we required the model to embody those funda-
mental characteristics such as richness of information, uncer-
tainty, interaction, and commitment, which we believe to be
essential to the robot problem solving situation. Within this
dominating constraint, we felt that most other design decisions
were arbitrary, and we did not-give much attention to such choices
involving inessential details.
-24-
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What is crucial in such a model is that the problems which
arise in terms of the simulation model be direct reflections of
general problems involving intelligent real-world activity,
rather than being specific properties of the particular simula-
tion which have no applicability to wider contexts. It has
happened again and again in simulation research that the model
becomes so simplified that the ultimate system designed in terms
of the model, while it "works" in the particular model situation,
adds little to our general store of knowledge and understanding
about the nature of intelligence. To illustrate the generality
of the simulation model that we have developed in this project,
we give on the following page a table of some important general
characteristics of the robot problem solving situation, each of
which is paired with an aspect of the simulation model which
embodies that characteristic.
This list could be extended to considerable length. What
it shows us is that our simulation model, however simplified and
arbitrary, is still realistic in the most crucial sense, namely
it provides meaty specific cases of many of the major conceptual
problems involved in the study of robot problem solving. Indeed,
in this first year we have not even begun to exhaust the poten-
tial for study presented by this model.
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General Characteristic
Interaction as source of
informationo
Uncertainty in information.
Available information too
rich in amount to be processed
by limited sensory channels.
Necessity of commitment
to an action in order to
gain information or solve
problem.
"Pattern recognition" of a
compound object consisting
of a spatial pattern of
simpler objects, received as
a temporal pattern.
Task performed not to
completion, but to criterion
as subgoal for some larger
purpose.
Interruption of action on the
basis of information gained
during its performance.
Control of a motor activity on
the basis of complex sensations
resulting from its performance.
Realization in Model
Robot gains information only
through simulated sensation.
Robot senses are inaccurate;
many objects are similar or
identical; robot can never be
sure-that it has not wandered
into unexplored territory.
Robot has single eye which must
scan and focus down to see detail;
world is rich in objects, and
they go out of view after robot
passes by them.
Robot must often move eye or
self to gain information, must
move itself to progress toward
goal locations; turning around
is difficult.
A "place" is a spatial arrange-
ment of "primitive objects"
(buildings, signs) that must be
recognized as a temporal sequence
of seen objects; the same place
may be seen in different temporal
sequences.
Robot needs to perform
recognition" only well enough to
enable it to follow a route; ab-
solute place recognition is
impossible, since there could
always be an identical-appearing
place somewhere else in the world.
Robot may begin to turn eye
toward object, catch sight of -a-
new object, and stop to look at
it.
Robot must slow down in order to
execute a turn; its knowledge of
the approaching intersection is
based only on visual information.
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IV. BEHAVIOR OF THE CURRENT ROBOT SYSTEM
In this section we will describe the behavioral repertoire
of the present robot system, and indicate how the behaviors are
produced. We have found (as have the builders of hardware
robots) that even the simplest of activities requires a very
considerable amount of analysis and programming before it can be
performed by a system that interacts with a complex environment.
Therefore, the attainments of our robot to date consist of modest,
basic behavioral routines, out of which we expect that more com-
plex behavior can eventually be built. From our present per-
spective, a behavior such as "visually recognizing a location"
is not to be regarded as a "simple" activity which is a building
block of more complex routines such as path-finding; on the con-
trary, we are at such a primitive stage that visual scene-recog-
nition merely looms on the horizon of what we can understand at
present, while path-finding is still beyond the horizon. (The
difficulties of the scene-recognition process form the topic of
our Section V.)
In the following sections, we will first introduce the
notion of a primitive version of a behavior. We will then de-
scribe the robot's three primitive behaviors: tracking an object,
focusing down on an object, and looking around at a scene. Then
we will explain the functioning of the problem solving executive
which attempts to integrate these abilities into a compound
behavior, namely the "exploration" of a scene.
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A. Primitive Behaviors
In order for an infant to recognize that an object maintains
its identity over time, he must be able to follow it if it moves.
But in order to follow an object, he must recognize that it
maintains its identity, else there would be nothing to follow.
These observations do not constitute a paradox, but they do indi-
cate that the activities of recognizing an object over time and
of visually following it are mutually dependent, and therefore
an infant — or a robot — cannot possess only one of them and
expect to learn the other. Since it is also impossible to learn
both at once, it follows that both of these behaviors must be
part of the innate equipment of a visually functioning child or
robot. But it is only required that these innate behaviors be
sufficient to support each other during the learning period of
child or robot. Such a minimal, innate behavior we will call
a primitive behavior.
The logic used in the preceding argument can be applied to
almost any behavior of an adult organism. Since almost any acti-
vity can potentially make use of almost any other, we are forced
to postulate the existence of a quintessential version of each
behavior which does not make use of any other. The situation is
very much like the definition of primitives in a mathematical
system, or the provision of "system functions" in a programming
system which allows recursive definitions. If you are going to
build molecules, you have to have atoms.
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Still speaking generally, we may point out at least five
special characteristics of the primitive versions of a process,
which set them apart from the more sophisticated versions that
the organism later learns:
First, the primitive versions are goal-independent; that
is, they are so straightforward that they function in the same
way, regardless of why they were invoked.
Second, the primitive versions are inflexible, non-adaptive,
for the same reason.
Third, because of their inflexibility, primitive versions
tend to have rather narrowly-defined criteria for their success
or failure. That is to say, if such a process is applied to a
situation which is only slightly inappropriate for it, it may
fail totally. The remarkable contextual tolerance that we are
accustomed to in complex processes arises because each such pro-
cess exists within a whole framework of goals, so that if one
approach fails, the system can realize what is wrong and try
another.
Fourth, when a primitive process does succeed, on the other
hand, it operates very efficiently. This advantage also arises
from its inflexibility, and balances against the disadvantage
mentioned previously.
Fifth, these primitive processes do not make use of the
system's acquired experience for their functioning. Rather,
they serve as. the basis for the acquisition of that experience.
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As a concrete example of a primitive process, we might
consider primitive object recognition. The sophisticated version
of object recognition is ineffably complex (see Section V), but
the primitive version is quite straightforward. A primitive
object, such as a building, is seen as a list of visual features.
Since the eye reports which visual subfield each feature comes
from, the features visible at any time can be "clumped" according
to the crude criterion of coming from the same visual subfield.
For the robot, at least, this clumping operation is the first
step on the road to its internal notion of "object".
One of the primary characteristics of an object is that it
maintains its identity over time. In order to recognize this,
the robot requires a process which identifies a clump appearing
at time, with a similar clump that appeared at timeQ. Now, there
are several disasters that might befall a clump between timeQ
and time,. It might be displaced in the visual field; it might be
split into two or more clumps (if it actually consisted of
features of several distinct objects, which happened to fall in
different subfields in the new view); it might grow (through the
addition of new. objects or through ±he more acute .perception of
objects already represented in the clump); it might shrink (if
it wanders into a less acute subfield); or it might disappear
from the field of view entirely. At the moment, we are using
a matching function that computes the goodness-of-match between
two clumps as the number of features that they have in common,
minus the number of features that either one has but the "other
lacks. Certainly this simple measure is susceptible to being
fooled in nastily-conceived situations, but in the actual per-
formance of the program it has yet to fail. This is mainly because
in its applications so far, the object has usually fallen near the
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fovea, and therefore many features of it were seen, so that it
could fairly readily be distinguished from nearby objects. We
feel that this is a valid reason for the matching to succeed.
On the other hand, we would not be too upset if the matcher
should confuse two nearly-identical nearby objects — this too
could be valid. (We tried to get it to confuse our three
absolutely-identical nearby apartment buildings, but it refused
to fall into the trap.)
Clearly this matching routine is the most primitive case of
"recognizing" an object (note that the "objects" it recognizes
are themselves spatially primitive). In particular, the above
routine is goal-independent, whereas the experientially-based
recognition of a compound object (a "place") is directly affected
by its subservience to some higher goal such as following a route.
The primitive version merely computes a simple measure, which can
be fooled by a variety of special cases. Yet in the general case,
it works efficiently and well. It does not make use of any ac-
quired knowledge about objects, but rather serves as the basis
for the acquisition of such knowledge.
The tracking, focusing down, and looking around processes
to be described in the following three sections are all primitive
versions of more elaborate, goal-dependent processes.
B. Tracking
The ability to track a moving object, or to track a station-
ary object while moving, is clearly an early prerequisite of
visual perception. This facility appears very early even in
human infants, and it is hard to imagine how tracking could be
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a learned behavior. We therefore chose tracking as the first of
a series of "innate" primitive abilities that must be supplied
to our robot.
During visual tracking, the eyes may be moved on the basis
of position (saccadic tracking) or velocity (smooth tracking).
In human tracking, the eyes initially make several saccades
(jumps), during which the velocity of the object is presumably
being estimated; then they switch to smooth tracking. For our
robot, we have so far programmed only saccadic tracking, but we
could easily have gone on to smooth tracking, as discussed below.
Feedback in Saccadic Tracking
One of our motivations in studying tracking is that it is a
process which by its very definition requires an integrated pro-
gram of activity and sensory feedback to be carried out over an
extended period of time. We feel that such integration is one
of the most important characteristics that distinguish a robot
system from an "abstract" problem solver.
Stated in programming terms, tracking cannot simply be
executed in the "one-shot" manner of an ordinary LISP function,
so we had to create some sort of executive structure to maintain
the tracking operation over time. Our initial executive was as
simple as could be: We designated a small "goal memory" that
would remember what the system was trying to do (in this case,
simply-the operator TRACK and a-representation of the object that
was being tracked), and at each quantum of time the executive
performed whatever operations were retained in the goal memory.
This was a very humble beginning, but it has already been much
expanded, as described in Section IV.E.
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The basic operation in saccadic tracking is to notice that
the tracked object has moved out of the center of the visual
field, and to reposition the eye accordingly. Now/ in general
this repositioning can itself be a feedback process. But even-
tually all feedback processes must be composed out of non-feedback
(endogenous) primitives; otherwise there would be a logical
regress, and nothing would ever get done. We chose to make the
repositioning operation be an endogenous process, by making sure
that the eye is always repositibned just enough to bring the
object back into the center of the visual field. Since the field
is divided into thirds both tangentially and radially, this means
that repositioning simply requires moving the focus point by a
third of the width of the field in the direction of the peripheral
subfield that the object has moved into.
Our current solutions to the problems of feedback, while very
simple, have begun to touch on some weighty issues. We saw that
the use of feedback demands that the system retain, over time,
some sort of representation of "what it is doing". This is already
a great departure away from algorithmic programming and toward
a "goal-oriented" system. We also touched on the notion of a
hierarchy of feedback processes (in that tracking uses reposition-
ing as a subprocess, but the latter may also be extended in time)..
This is the forerunner of many problems of coordination that we
will not long be able to (nor want to) avoid;
Tracking by Velocity
Our program succeeded well in tracking an object while moving
down the road at 25 feet per second, given a visual field 60° wide,
and passing within 10 feet of the object at its nearest point.
With other values of these parameters the object could move out
of view in one quantum, in which case primitive tracking would fail.
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When we graphed the focus position of the eye against a plot
of the actual position of the object, we were surprised to find
that the curve for the actual position interested us more than
the performance of the saccadic tracker. The following figure
shows two curves, one for the actual angular position and one
for the actual radial position of the object as a function of
road distance to opposition with the object (i.e. as a function
of time, if the robot is moving with constant velocity). Strangely
enough, the curve for angular position consists mainly of three
sections of nearly-constant slope. Stranger still, the curve for
radial position could also be approximated by three line segments
that join at the same points as those which would approximate the
other curve (about 15 feet on either side of the opposition
point). These facts clearly suggest a program which tracks a
passing object in three phases (not counting an initial saccadic
lock-on phase), where each phase is characterized by a constant
rate of change for both angle and radius of the eye's focus
position. What is surprising is that this conclusion arises
merely from the geometry of the situation, independent of any
properties of the perceptual system! So one might expect to find
a three-phase tracking procedure in living systems as well as in
robots.
The principal reason that we have not yet programmed velo-
city-based tracking is that we became more interested in other
problems. Also, the three-phase tracking process demands more
sophisticated use of feedback than saccadic tracking does
(especially at the points"where" a transition between phases is —
indicated), .and we wanted to study the constraints on the executive
in another context, rather than designing it solely around the
tracking procedure.
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ANGLE TO OBJECT (DEGREES)
DISTANCE TO OBJECT (FEET)
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C. Focusing Down
Once the robot can, through tracking, keep an object centered
in its visual field, the next problem is to focus down on the
object so as to pick up more and more of its detail. The details
so obtained are used to build up a stored representation of the
object. When, later, the object is to be visually recognized,
the focusing-down procedure is reapplied to it, and the newly
seen features are matched against those already stored.
Again, we note that the objects involved here are themselves
primitive, so that the details obtained by primitive focusing down
are only visual features. The more general version of focusing
down is applicable to compound objects, and is capable of detect-
ing sub-objects and their relationships. Also, we should repeat
that for convenience we will treat focusing down as a function of
the eye, whereas in actuality the mechanism of "focal attention"
has no known physical locus.
The process of primitive focusing down is actually a very
simple one of-matching, the only complication being that there- are
three memory structures involved. There is in Long-Term Memory
(LTM) a representation of some object previously seen; in Short-
Term Memory (STM) the system builds a representation of the object
it is currently focusing down on; and in Immediate Sensory Memory
(ISM) is found the set of features that are actually being seen
at any given moment. In the best of cases, a subset of the
features in ISM will map into the features specified in the rep-
resentation in STM> which will likewise map into the features
recorded in LTM. The system extends this mapping to include more
and more features by narrowing the width and the depth of the
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visual field in alternation, so as to take in more features of
fewer objects.
If no clump of features in ISM matches the representation
in STM, then the object has inadvertantly been lost in the process
of narrowing the visual field. If the ISM set matches but does
not exceed that in STM, then more focusing down is required to
assure identification of the object. If the ISM set matches and
exceeds that in STM, then the excess is matched against the
representation in LTM. If it still matches, then features are
copied from LTM to STM; in other words, the robot assumes that it
is seeing features of a known object. If the ISM set matches and
exceeds the kernels in LTM, then the LTM representation itself is
added to; this means that the object is being seen in more detail
than it ever was before, and the detail is recorded. Finally, if
the ISM kernels turn out to be inconsistent with those in LTM,
then the excess kernels are entered into the STM representation,
and that is copied over into LTM; a new object has been seen,
and a new LTM entry is created.
In summary: The robot attempts to maximize the match be-
tween what it is currently seeing (in Immediate Sensory Memory)
and what it once saw in the past (held in Long-Term Memory). In
order to mediate this matching process over several quanta of
time (and hence over several refocusings of the eye), 'a temporary
representation in Short-Term Memory is built up. We should men-
tion that the sort of "Long-Term Memory" representation we are
using at present is extremely impoverished: it does not store the
spatial relationships among objects, and hence is incapable of
representing a "scene". We simply are not yet far enough along to
have considered the problems of scene representation.
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It should be noted that the storage of previously unseen
features and the recognition of an object in terms of previously
seen features are treated as parts of one and the same process.
The robot must recognize an object before it can add new details
to its internal representation; conversely, the recognition pro-
cess often produces novel.details as a by-product, and it.would be
senseless to throw them away. Here is an instance of a simple
yet important principle in animal behavior: take heed of inform-
ation which is fortuitously discovered. What makes this principle
interesting is that it violates the strict goal-directedness that
we often like to impute to animal behavior. That is, an animal
(including a human, and hopefully also a robot) will remember
information merely because it arrives free of charge, even though
it was not sought and may not be connected to any immediate goal.
Indeed, an organism would be in a difficult logical bind if it
had to explicitly seek out information that was unknown to it!
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the focusing-down
process is that it has no logical termination. The proper time
to stop focusing down is when a certain amount of focusing effort
has been expended, with no compensating results obtained. These
concepts of "effort" and "results" -- combining to give a notion
of "progress" ~ are primary elements of the executive decision
procedure which is responsible for choosing among competing pro-
cesses. Therefore, we will defer their discussion until the
section on the executive (Section IV.E). Suffice it to say that
many activities besides focusing down have this same property,
that they are terminated not when they reach some logical com-
pletion, _but simply when they cease _to. be sufficiently productive.
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D. Looking Around
In order to gather information about its environment, the
robot must look around at the scenery that surrounds it. Again
we find it important to distinguish two levels of the looking-
around process: Experience-based looking around makes use of an
internal model of what surrounds the robot, and may participate
in higher goals such as remembering or recognizing a route; it
is at least partially a process of verifying (recognizing) that
the robot is in such-and-such a hypothesized place. By contrast,
primitive looking around requires only a temporary internal model
of the scene, it does not involve the verification of a hypoth-
esis, and it need not serve any definite higher goal other than
the exploration of the robot's surroundings. In this section we
will concern ourselves solely with primitive looking around.
Basically, the looking-around process is a solution to the
problem of focusing down on several recently-discovered objects
"all at once". The problem would be trivial except that there is
only one eye, and so the robot's executive must time-share the
focusing-down subprocesses in an efficient manner. A great deal
of our effort has gone into making explicit the notion of "an
efficient manner" in this context, as will become apparent in
the next section.
A small complication arises because the robot must have some
motivation to first look in a direction which is not known to
contain any objects. For this reason, along with the focusing-
down subprocesses, the robot maintains subprocesses which, when
run, turn the eye to one of the nine major coordinate points
shown in the figure on p.23. By intermittently running these
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positional subprocesses, the robot makes sure that it does not
miss any of the scenery that lies around it.
Thus, the looking-around process itself consists in nothing
more than the temporal interleaving of a set of information-
gathering subprocesses. These subprocesses are of two types:
(1) focusing-down processes, one for each object that the robot
has noticed in the scene, which attempt to see more and more
features of the objects, and (2) positional processes, one for
each of the nine main coordinate points in the robot's surround-
ings, which turn the eye towards those points in the hope that
some new objects will be seen there. The heart of the looking
around process is the executive which is responsible for inter-
leaving these subprocesses in an efficient manner. The executive
will be discussed in detail in the next section.
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Without further ado, we present an example of the behavior
of the current looking-around program, in the figure below:
In this figure, we have superimposed the eye's scan-path over a
map of the territory in front of the robot. The scan-path is the
locus of the center point of the robot's visual field.
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In this example, the robot was standing still, facing a right-
angled street corner. Objects along the roadside are shown as
boxes in the figure. The robot's eye was greatly attracted by
the cluster of objects just to the right of center (the cluster
to the far right was totally invisible to itf owing to limit-
ations in the trigonometry routines which compute what the eye
can see). The scan-path clearly displays the program's attempt
to find a balance between moving to unseen areas so as to find new
objects, and fixating on the ones it has already found so as to
get a better look at them. The figure of course fails to show
the small local eye movements which were involved in successively
focusing-down on one or several objects within each fixation.
It can be said that the scan-path shown above looks very
reasonable considering the distribution of objects around the
robot, and it seems to have a qualitative similarity to actual
scan-paths that have been recorded in eye-movement studies of
human subjects. It would be very difficult to state more rigorous
criteria for knowing when this program was behaving "correctly".
Indeed, one of the most interesting characteristics of the looking-
around process is that it appears to be "ill-defined", in the sense
that there is no obvious algorithm for doing it, nor is there an
obvious algorithm for determining when it has been successfully
done. Ultimately, we expect that the performance of any process
will be evaluated, and if necessary corrected, by a higher-level
process that makes use of it (e.g., in this case, a process that
is trying to recognize where the robot is). But for the moment,
our inability to assess correctness is a very unpleasant frus-
tration of scientific rigor — not to mention a source of headaches
for the robot designer who would like to know when his program
is finally working correctly!
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E. The Executive
In this section we will describe the operation of the
problem solving executive, which is the heart of our current
simulation system. The present executive is by no means a general
problem solver; rather, it is designed to control the looking-
around process described in the previous section. We have not yet
integrated tracking into the looking-around process, but we
believe that this would be fairly easy, and that it would not have
much effect on the structure of the executive.
In the first subsection below, we state the fundamental
problems that the executive must cope with. In the second sub-
section, we list many of the particular factors that must go into
the decisions made by the executive. In the third subsection,
we sketch the major steps in the executive's actual operation.
E.I. Basic Notions Concerning the Executive
The function of the executive is to decide, at each moment,
what the robot should be doing. It must make a decision which,
if not the best possible, is at least a good one given the
information available at the moment. Note that we have said
"at the moment", for many of the executive's problems arise from
the way, in which the robot's circumstances and information vary
from moment to moment. Implicit in the responsibility of the
executive is a dynamic adaptiveness which reacts properly to new
circumstances as they arise. In particular, it is important to
note that the performance of any one action may affect the
prospects for any other action — even including the desirability
of its own continuation.
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The adaptive alertness of the executive must be counter-
balanced by an ability to coordinate the robot's activities so
as to produce useful results. One of the simplest aspects of such
coordination is a sort of inertia which dampens the adaptiveness
of the executive's response. Without this inertia, we have seen
behavior (in our simulations) in which the robot's attention
oscillates from one object to another, without ever being able
to concentrate on any one object long enough to see it clearly.
So, the executive must be distractable enough to respond to
important unexpected conditions, yet single-minded enough to
get something accomplished.
In order to discuss the kind of coordination over time that
the executive must achieve, we should think of the executive as
manipulating whole processes, rather than individual actions.
Thus, although the basic duty of the executive is to select the
proper action at each moment, this cannot be done efficiently
except in the context of the actions that have gone before, and
the actions that are anticipated in the future — in other words,
in the context of a process that the executive wishes to perform.
Processes are the units in terms of which execution, interruption,
resumption, progress, prediction, coordination and induction are
defined. It is still an open theoretical problem to specify all
that a process is, and in the course of our programming we have
had several occasions to realize how tricky this notion can be.
So, the executive is seen as an agent which selects and
organizes a cadre of individual processes, all in response to
the flux of incoming information about the environment. It is
especially important to realize that all of the decisions made
by the executive are dependent on the particular fine details
of a momentary situation. The executive is not like a philosopher
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building theoretical constructs in an informational vacuum;
rather, it is fanatically attentive to the flux of detailed
information that is coming in from the world around it. It
uses only a few general decision rules to organize all of this
data once it is collected. We believe that there is no way of
understanding intelligent behavior unless we appreciate how
closely it is tied in with the intricate details of the environ-
ment. This is where the complexity lies, and not in the mech^-
anisms of intelligence themselves. Certainly in the case of
our robot's executive, much of the design problem lay simply in
keeping track of all of the information that had to be weighed
in the executive's decisions.
E.2. Factors in Executive Decision-Making
Below we will briefly describe the various sorts of
information that our executive takes into account in determining
a good course of action for the robot. We will limit ourselves
to discussing these factors individually, in isolation from each
other. The reason for this is simply that the way in which they
are combined cannot be described in much simpler terms than the
computer program which actually combines them, and we doubt that
the reader would benefit from a discussion of the program in all
its detail. Moreover, the factors themselves each provide a little
morsel of food for theoretical thought, whereas the devices by
which they are combined cannot be said to have much theoretical
interest.
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a. Factors relating to individual processes
When the executive comes to consider each individual process,
it tries to estimate an expected payoff from allowing that
process to run one more step. In this section we will enumerate
the factors that go into this computation * It is worth keeping
in mind that that is indeed an estimation rather than a certain
prediction, which implies among other things that the system
could eventually be made to improve its estimates by comparing
them with the payoffs that were actually received. (Our current
system does not do this.)
(i) Steps; We assume that there is, for each process at
each moment, such a thing as "the next step". There are some
problems with this (as we will see), but for the moment assume
that such a concept is available to the executive.
(ii) Drive Strength; Each process is assumed to have a
time-varying motivational component, attributable to nothing more
than the robot's need to perform that process. In the case of
fdcusing-down processes, this "drive strength" is assumed to
increase with time to a maximum, and then decrease, so that an
object which goes unattended for long enough will eventually be
forgotten about. The processes which cause the eye to move to
new territory, on the other hand, show no such decrease (else
the robot might eventually fall into permanent inactivity); their
drive strength simply increases linearly with time.
(iii) Salience: Some objects are inherently more attractive,
or salient than others. For our robot, as for humans, stoplights
attract the visual attention considerably more than do buildings
or signs.
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(iv) Progress; Since the executive must estimate a future
payoff, one of the most important quantities for it to consider
is the time-derivative of payoff, which we think of as the "rate
of progress" of the process. Besides playing a major role in
estimation, a progress measure provides the most natural solution
to the problem of processes which have no logical termination:
they are simply run until their payoff yield falls below that of
competing processes.
In the particular case of a focusing-down process, the
payoff is in terms of "information" about the object that is under
scrutiny. For a given set of visual features, the information
value can be equated to the logarithm of the reciprocal of the
number of objects in the world consistent with that set of
features. We have provided our robot with a table from which it
can in fact determine the number of objects consistent with any
set of features; needless to say, this is a crude simulation of
another sort of estimate that really should be made on the basis
of the robot's statistical experience with the world. "Progress",
then, is a bow-shaped function of the amount of information
accumulated: slow at the beginning and end of the inspection of
an object, and rapid in the middle. (This curve is also supplied
artificially in our simulation, since we cannot take actual
derivatives in our discrete-time system.)
Notice, by the way, that it is possible to compute the precise
quantity of recognitional certainty that is contributed by each
visual feature as it is perceived. This measure can be called
the criteriality of each feature to the recognition of the object.
One way of regarding the predictive application of the progress
measure is feature-by-feature: that is, if the next feature is
expected (on the basis of previous experiences) to be one of high
criteriality, the estimated payoff for the process is high, and
it should be given high priority in the competition for execution.
Low-criteriality features, on the other hand, may not be worth
looking for.
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(v) Effort; One way to maximize the payoff of an action is
to minimize the effort that the action requires. In our simulation,
actions are attributed with varying amounts of effort requirement
(measured in arbitrary units), according to reasonable guidelines;
for instance, it requires more effort to move the eye a long
distance than a short one. Among other things, this attention to
effort causes the robot to spend a considerable amount of time
looking at objects which are near to each other, rather than
scanning wildly around to look at objects strictly in order of
their interestingness. We believe that people and animals behave
in the same way, for the same reason.
(vi) Confidence; The estimates made by the executive will
vary in their accuracy, because some actions have more predictable
consequences than others, and because there may be more information
available about some processes than others. Over the course of
its experience, the system can gather statistics as to the accuracy
of its predictions, and then use them to estimate the accuracy
of future predictions. Since our current simulation does not do
any statistical learning, we have had to supply these "confidence"
factors in advance.
b. Factors relating to the coordination of several processes
The factors mentioned in the preceding section are combined
to yield an estimated payoff for the next step of each available
process. But the choice of the actual next step to perform is
still complicated by the need to coordinate the interaction among
individual processes.
(i) Combined Payoffs; It may happen that several processes
require the same action as their next step, in which case the
estimated payoffs for each process are combined. Thus it can
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happen that the robot will choose to turn its eye toward, say,
three mildly-interesting buildings which are close together,
rather than toward a single, isolated building which itself is
more interesting than any of the three. What we have here is
really a first inkling of the notion of sub-object: the three
buildings can be said to form a complex or sub-scene which has its
own identity, and which can be considered as a single object that
is more interesting than the isolated building. We believe that
the hierarchical structure that the human mind is known to impose
on scenes arises precisely because a hierarchical organization
simplifies the executive coordination of such processes as looking
around at a scene.
(ii) Variations in Individual Factors; If we consider the
factors used to evaluate individual processes, listed in the last
section, we see that some of them change with the mere passage
of time: certainly drive strength and progress do. These factors
can be even more strongly disrupted by unexpected events in the
external world, or by the activities of the robot itself. . To
give a simple example, if the eye moves away from the location
of a particular building, then the "next step" in the focusing-
down process for that building changes: the "next step" is now
to restore the eye position. It is apparent that the executive
must continually monitor the condition of all available processes,
since even the next step required by a process is subject to
unexpected change.
In our simulation, t.-is "continual monitoring" is performed
by incessant serial evaluation. One cannot help but feel that
processes ought to be independent entities, capable of monitoring
themselves. This brings us to the "demon" conception discussed
in Sections II.B and VI.G.
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(iii) New Processes; The executive is also responsible for
realizing when it has received input information that cannot be
assimilated by any existing process, and for creating a new process
to deal with this information. In our model, a new process is
created whenever a visual feature is seen that is not claimed
by any focusing-down process.
(iv) Single-mindedness; We have already mentioned the need
for a sort of cognitive inertia or damping to prevent the executive
from oscillating among several closely-competing processes. One
way in which this is enforced is by charging a "changeover overhead"
effort to each process which would seek to displace the current
one. Another is by giving the current process first crack at the
visual input which was generated by executing i'ts own previous
step. This latter privilege is surprisingly important in allowing
the focusing-down process to concentrate stably on a single object.
Finally, we should mention that the tenacity with which the
current process is pursued is a function of its rate of progress;
when progress falls off, the time has come to turn to some other
process.
(v) Interruption; In our system, the executive interrupts
a process when it finds another process to be sufficiently merit-
orious. In order to be interruptable, each process must of course
carry with it enough information to allow it to resume later on.
As we have pointed out, the resumption of a process may require
some explicit actions, such as moving the eye back to where it
was when the process was interrupted. In the most general case,
it may be difficult to tell which preconditions for a process
have changed since it was interrupted, which of its results have
come undone, and so it may be hard to know just how to resume.
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Here we have an instance of the "frame problem" (anything.may
change the conditions for anything else), which has no general
solution. It must be solved for the particular case, as we have
solved it. In our particular case, the focusing-down process
records the parameters of the eye when it is interrupted, and
restores them if necessary when it resumes.
(vi) Temporal Integration; In our simulation, it is also
possible for an action to engender input information which leads
to its own interruption. For example, if the eye is moved
through a substantial distance, it may well catch sight of some
new object, for which a new focusing-down process will be created,
and this focusing-down process may supercede the positional
process which had originally invoked the eye motion (indeed, the
very purpose of the positional processes is to turn up new objects
in thisimanner). Note that the eye motion may be interrupted before
it has carried through to its full extent. This sort of interrup-
tion in mid-step can take place when there is a discrepancy between
the time-scales of two activities, in this case, between the time
required to move the eye a long distance and the time required
to notice a new object. In other words, there is a coordination
problem when a "step" of one process takes longer than a "step"
of some other. In such cases, the interruption of the first
process in mid-step can present the executive with severe
difficulties in keeping track of what is going on. In our program
we have solved these problems by ad hoc devices. We still are
just beginning to have a feel for the more sophisticated problems
that may arise in the temporal integration of interacting
processes.
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E.3. The Executive Cycle
Apart from the details noted in the preceding section, the
basic structure of the executive's operation is very simple:
1. New sensory input is received, and each process is
given a chance to propose a next step, and to evaluate the various
measures for that next step.
2. Any visual features that were unclaimed in the previous
step are used as the basis for forming new focusing-down processes.
3. Measures are combined for all processes having the same
next step.
4. The next step with the highest rating is chosen.
5. If the next step is consistent with the process that
proposed the last step, it is simply readied for execution.
Otherwise, a comparison is made, taking into account the rate of
progress of the previously-selected process, and the "overhead"
effort of switching to a new one. As a result, either the old
process is continued, or the new candidate is enstated as the
current process'. -
6. The selected next step is executed. The program for that
step bears full responsibility for assuring that its process is
resumed correctly. (Probably this responsibility should be given
at least in part to the executive.)
7. Physics is invoked, and new sensory input is computed.
8. The executive begins again at Step 1.
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From the simplicity of this framework, it should be clear
that the executive really embodies only one general principle:
"At each moment, do the best thing you can." Aside from this,
all is specifics, as outlined in the previous section. One
great -reward of the present study is that we have been able to
isolate these particular factors that go into the executive
decision, and include them in our program in as explicit a
manner as possible. In most computer programs, even "intelligent"
ones, it is the programmer and not the program who keeps track
of goals, estimates progress, effort, and confidence measures,
plans out alternative actions, anticipates the need for inter-
rupts, and so on; all of these considerations become implicit
in the structure of the program.
To the extent that we have been able to represent the bases
for executive decision-making explicitly, we have in a limited but
significant way allowed the system to program itself in response
to its interactions with an unpredictable environment. We
believe that this is a first step toward a system which can
exercise its own active intelligence in responding to problems
that confront it, rather than doggedly applying a few clever
techniques supplied by its human programmer.
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V. THE REPRESENTATION AND RECOGNITION OF COMPOUND OBJECTS
In our work on the robot simulation, one major problem has
emerged as a natural aiming point: the question of how the robot
should internally represent a scene so that it can later recognize
the same scene, and the inseparable question of how the recognition
process should operate, given a scene and an internal representa-
tion.
To be more specific, the "primitive" objects in our
simulated world are buildings, signs, and stoplights. They are
primitive because the eye, if properly set, can gather in all
available information about the object (i.e. all its features)
at one time, without performing any sequence of actions to seek
them out. By contrast, a "compound" object is one that requires
some sort of active sensory operation (such as eye movements),
or at least some time-course of sensory predictions (such as, in
music, following a single voice in counterpoint), in order to be
fully perceived. In the robot's world, the compound objects are
"places", i.e. spatial constellations of primitive objects.
The "recognition" of a compound object is the process of
matching a current sensory situation to a stored characterization.
The "representation" of the compound object is that stored
characterization which is used in its recognition. Since the
whole recognition process is viewed as black-box behavior, there
is no theoretical basis for drawing the line between a static
"structural" component (the representation) and a dynamic
"process" component (the recognition procedure itself). We make
this distinction only because it seems to produce for us the most
comprehensible description of a very complex behavior.
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The place recognition problem for the robot is a perfect
miniature model for the "pattern recognition" problem that has
dominated much thinking in the fields of artificial intelligence
and psychology. Obviously, we can view this problem only as a
long-term goal of our investigation. Still, we feel that we have
already gained some insights into the place-recognition problem
from working on our simulation, and we will set forth these
ideas in the present section.
A. Relativity of Definition
The first problem in understanding place-recognition is
that a "place" is not well-defined, either in common usage or in
terms of the model. Places need not have definite boundaries
where one leaves off and the next begins. We will therefore have
to assume that the criteria which determine the limits of the
representation of a place are not necessarily present in the
physical structure of the world. Then they must come from within
the cognitive system itself. Evidently they derive from pragmatic
constraints, having to do with improving the ability to attain some
survival goal of the system, such as finding its way around. That
is to say, a "place" is delimited by the sufficiency of its
representation to enable some higher goal, such as recognizing
where to turn in order"to get from point A to point B. We may
express this relativity as follows:
The representation and recognition of placest and of
compound objects in general, are not defined except in terms
of higher pragmatic goals of the organism.
Since recognition is always a sub-goal of some other process,
the amount of effort allotted to it depends on the economics of
attaining the larger goal. For example, the robot might find
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that it could get a much better look at a certain place if it
were to stop and back up, but the act of stopping and backing up
would be antithetical to the larger goal of getting from point A
to point B.
B. Graded Nature of Recognition
Another difficulty in the recognition process is that it can
never be an all-or-nothing affair, even if the robot were to
possess error-free sensory systems. The reason is simply that the
robot, in concluding "this is Place P", cannot logically exclude
the possibility that it is actually in some other place which
merely looks like Place P, so far as its internal representation
of Place P goes. This is true so long as the robot's world is
effectively unbounded (i.e. the robot cannot explore all of it in
its lifetime); it can also be a problem in a bounded world if the
robot's place-representations are habitually underspecified. A
converse problem also exists in any world that is subject to
change: the robot may actually be at Place P, but it may look
different than it did when the representation was created, either
because it has changed or because the robot is seeing it from a
different viewing angle. Under any of these conditions, all of
which pertain to any realistic situation, it is impossible for the
recognition process to confirm or reject a hypothesis with absolute
certainty.
Object-recognition is never a binary decision process, but
is always one of computing a certainty measure that is less than
absolute certainty.
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C. Information Density
In order to see what this certainty-of-recognition measure
depends on, let us imagine that one of the\characteristics of
Place P is that there is a stopsign there. Now, if it happened
that there were only one stopsign in the world, the sighting of
a stopsign would uniquely identify Place P. On the other hand,
if there were a stopsign at every intersection, the sighting of
a stopsign would provide no recognition information at all. Of
course, we have just pointed out that the robot can never know
the exact statistics of the occurrence of objects in its effect-
ively-unbounded world, but in a homogeneous environment it can
gain a good approximate knowledge of those statistics. These
statistics, then, define a measure of information density over
the possible features of the world: density accumulates around
the rarer features or groups of features.
The informativeness of an observation, or of the inclusion
of an observation in the representation of an object, is dependent
on the statistics of the occurrence of that observation.
Thus, the efficient representation and recognition of places
depends on the collection of a very considerable body of statisti-
cal information, so that only the most informative features may
be recorded and looked for. All of this must seem obvious to
those who think of information in Shannon terms, but workers in
artificial intelligence have too long gone on simply reckoning
any predicate-clause as "information", without recognizing that
crucial degrees of informativeness exist.
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Do Adapting the Sequence of Recognition
Since the primitive objects that make up a place vary in
their informational value, it would seem that the most efficient
procedure for recognizing a compound object would be first to
look for its most characteristic sub-object, then to look for the
second-most characteristic one, then the third, et cetera. This
is not necessarily true, for two reasons. First of all,
looking for each of the primitive objects requires intervening
motor activities, and the expense of such actions (in time and
effort) varies with the physical proximity of the objects. Thus,
if the first, third, and fifth most characteristic sub-objects
were on one side of the street, and the second, fourth, and sixth
most characteristic on the other, it would certainly be inefficient
to look for them in serial order. Notice also that a grouping of
sub-objects may be very distinctive, even if its component
primitive objects are not. Such a grouping forms a compound
object of its own, and this compound object is a sub-object of
the larger compound object.
The second reason for scanning in an order different from
that given by informativeness is that there is no telling which
objects will have been noticed fortuitously before the given
recognition hypothesis was made. In other words, if the robot
has scanned ten primitive objects before it hypothesizes that it
is in Place P, it would be horribly wasteful to throw away all
the information just collected, and begin some pre-sequenced scan.
Hence: ... ... ... .
The recognition process must adapt inself to the sequence
of events in each particular case, and to the geometry of the
informative features of the object being recognized.
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This supple adaptiveness may prove to be the hardest aspect
of the recognition process for us to come to understand. Certainly
the process is not performed optimally in all cases, but just as
certainly it is performed at least efficiently in the majority of
cases. It is not easy to see exactly how this is accomplished.
This adaptiveness also argues for a representation of the
locations of sub-objects in terms of spatial coordinates rather
than in terms of sequences of relative movements. This is an
unfortunate conclusion, because certainly the most efficient
representation of a compound object would be in terms of a definite
sequence of actions, such as:
see sub~object A •> turn eye 40° •* see sub-object B -»• turn...
However, if this sequential order is often going to be violated,
it becomes necessary, although less efficient, to store coordinates
for each sub-object, and compute the proper action to get to it
at the time that the action is needed. We suspect that in
biological recognition systems a combination of both representa-
tions is used: a representation in terms of movements is
available to give speed, and a coordinate representation is avail-
able to give flexibility. Unfortunately, when it comes to
modeling a complex process, this redundancy of means only makes
it harder for us to comprehend how the process operates.
E. Hypothesis Evocation
In mentioning that it might require the sighting of several
sub-objects before a place-recognition hypothesis is evoked, we
omitted to ask how this evocation process itself is carried out.
What first suggests to the robot that it might be in a given
location, so that it can run the recognition procedure on that
hypothesis? In some cases, to be sure, a perception is predicted
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on the basis of a formerly-experienced sequence — e.g., Place B
followed Place A before, so look for Place B to follow Place A
now. But in many cases (such as being lost, or unexpectedly
discovering a new route to a known place) it is necessary to
recognize a place that appears by surprise.
It seems that there is little alternative to postulating
an "associative net structure" for the process which retrieves
place-representations from memory for use as hypotheses. The
point is simply that there is no definable retrieval "key"; rather,
any sufficiently-characteristic subset of the scene will retrieve
the hypothesis of the whole. It should be clear that the greater
the number of sub-objects seen, and the greater their informational
value, the more certain the correct hypothesis is to be retrieved
and tried out first. We are still a very long way from being
able to easily make models of processes that behave in this way.
Recognition begins with the evocation of hypotheses, by a
process which appears to be a non-sequential, keyless, content-
addressing search,
 4
In the above paragraphs we have sketched some of the major
factors in describing the representation and recognition of
compound objects. Needless to say, we could expand this discussion
by a large factor, and still be only at the beginning of under-
standing how general "pattern recognition" is performed. But
still, we_ feel that, we have isolated the essential ingredient of
the process, namely a high degree of adaptiveness, supported by
a very attentive use of statistical information. If we-continue
investigating object-recognition from this point of view, we
should eventually be able to puzzle out one of the fundamental
processes of intelligent behavior.
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VI. THE ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIORAL SYSTEMS
We have devoted a fair amount of time to the consideration
of a possible general theory of the organization of behavioral
systems. Our immediate motivation for such a study arose out of
direct experience in programming the robot simulation. It often
happened that we could propose two or more different ways to
organize a particular behavioral routine, and we were distressed
by the fact that we could find no theoretical basis on which
to decide such choices.
We were further motivated by the fact that certain organiza-
tional properties recur with remarkable consistency in large
behavioral systems (computer programs), even in different systems
with very diverse purposes. For example, feedback control of an
external condition is found in many programs, as ,are means for
coping with the attendant problems of waiting for the condition
to become satisfactory, of interrupting some higher process if
the condition goes out of bounds, and so on. Other examples
include hierarchical organization of processes, predictive
decision-making in the face of uncertainty, and priority scheduling
in cases of competition for limited resources.
These considerations led us to undertake the investigation
of complex behavioral systems in general. Our grandiose ideal
hope was that we might uncover some comprehensive theory, along
with an attendant notation, which would allow us to describe and
design behavioral systems at will, much as the calculus allows
us to describe and design various physical systems. Certainly
we did not evolve such a general theory, and indeed we now see
some deep reasons why it may not be possible to create one at
all. Still, we have learned a great deal about ways of organizing
behavioral systems, and about the circumstances under which a
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given organization is appropriate. The results of our investiga-
tion are presented in the following pages„
AO The Relativity of Behavioral Description
Traditional mathematics arose from the attempt to describe
the physical world. In the last two centuries, man has learned
that this descriptive tool can be turned around and used to
design new physical systems to suit particular needs. In the
case of computer programming languages, the story is the opposite:
These languages were created in order to enable the design of
computational algorithms, and only later have they been applied
to the description of natural systems. This is certainly a case
in which the solution (computer languages) supplied the problem
(describing behavioral systems). Unfortunately, this order of
events has led to the common assumption that computer languages
do in fact solve the problem, that is that they are an adequate
mathematics for describing behavioral systems. There may be some
difficulties with this assumption.
Traditional mathematics will allow an engineer to analyze^
a design for a new electronic circuit (say), but it usually will
not lead him to a good design. For this he must rely on experience,
inspiration, or at best on a much more complex sort of mathematical
computation. Thus, in the traditional case, design is basically
an optimizing process, while description is not. We are beginning
to believe that in the case of behavioral systems, this difference-
does not exist; rather the problem of describing a behavioral
system is also inherently one of finding a good description, so
that describing behavioral systems is just as much an optimizing
process as designing them.
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To see how this might be true, consider a desk calculator,
of the sort that is 100% mechanical. A set of blueprints for
such a machine might tell us all that we could possibly know
about its structure; they might even allow us to build a working
copy of the device ourselves, so that in some sense they consti-
tute a complete description of the calculator. But certainly the
blueprints fail in some fundamental way to tell us how the
machine works, and what it does, for they do not describe any of
the operations that it performs. Here is the apparent paradox:
Even a complete description of the structure of a system may fail
to be a description of its behavior. But what is there left to
describe?
What is left is a set of criteria which exist in the mind
of the (human) recipient of the description. Suppose we undertake
to describe how the calculator divides. To one man we must say:
"You punch in A, press the Divide button, punch in B, and then
press the Equals button." To another man we must say that it
divides by repeated subtraction. To a third man we must give a
long rigmarole about which ratchets turn which shafts. In short,
there is no answer, no description of "how the machine divides",
except in terms of the questions that the description is intended
to answer. It is in this sense that a description is not a
description unless it is a "good" one.
Now, no doubt this sort of relativity holds trivially for
any descriptive system, but the mere existence of traditional
mathematics proves the existence of broadly agreed-upon, and
therefore implicit, description criteria for physical systems.
Apparently such implicit agreement is lacking when it comes to
behavioral systems, with the consequence that there is no canoni-
cal description of such a system, and hence no simple "mathematics"
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in the traditional sense of a symbolic system which can be
applied descriptively in a straightforward way.
We might remark that the fact that there is no single
"correct" or "true" description of the behavior of a complex
system does not, of course, mean that there is no true substrate
to the behavior. The desk calculator clanks away unconcernedly,
leaving us to puzzle out behavioral notions such as "the process
of division".
We have belabored the point of this section because we feel
that it dominates the rest of our discussion. Indeed, if the
intuitions expressed here are correct, then it may never be
possible to find the sort of calculus of behavioral organization
that we set out in search of. Still, we believe that there is
much to be learned, even if we cannot formalize our results as
fully as we had hoped.
Since our desire for a.general calculus appears impossible
to fulfill, we have retreated to our secondary motivation, namely
the observed commonality of organizational devices in widely
differing'behavioral computer systems. Concepts like "interrupt",
"backtracking", "executive", and so on are known to be important,
and they will not disappear on us like the notion of a calculus
of behavioral organization. Therefore, as a first step we have
set out to examine such concepts piecemeal - that is, without
any attempt at synthesis. By concentrating on these concepts, we
can .gain useful insights into important-behavioral mechanisms,
and at the same time we can slowly flush out the underlying
relationships among various aspects of behavioral organization.
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B. Hierarchical Organization of Processes
Any behavior that we observe must unfold linearly with time;
why then should we describe or design a behavioral system in
terras of a hierarchy of processes? Why do we not represent every
system simply as a linear sequence of actions? The reason,
evidently, is that we are able to see significant recurring
patterns in a linear sequence of events, and we attribute the
appearance of similar sub-sequences to the presence of a single
"sub-process". That is, we form the concepts of individual sub-
processes, such as "squaring a number" or "grasping an object",
by induction over time, in precisely the same manner that we form
object-concepts such as "dog" or "sunset". The nesting of
process-concepts gives us the same sort of hierarchy that we have
in the case of object-concepts, where "collie" is a sub-concept
of "dog", which is a sub-concept of "mammal".
Because of our experience with hierarchically structured
systems (e.g. computer programs and human management structures),
we tend to think of hierarchical behavioral organization as being
similarly "real", i.e. part of the mechanism that actually
generates the behavior. This need not necessarily be the case.
For example, we can take any activity, such as "grasping an object",
and break it down into further ones, such as "opening the hand",
"orienting the hand", "moving the hand to the object", etc.; but
this analysis does not mean that grasping actually proceeds in
phases. The activity could be entirely preprogrammed and
integrated, or it could be organized in some very different way.
(Recall the example of the desk calculator: Its "behavior" is
not the same thing as its "mechanism".)
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Thus, the act of temporal induction, and hence the description
in terms of a hierarchy, come from us, and not necessarily from
the system that we are describing. This relativity implies that
the level of detail and the descriptive particulars in a hierarch-
ical representation depend on the needs of the person performing
the induction, and not on absolute properties of the behavior in
question. This fact is familiar to any programmer, who must
continually decide whether or not a sequence of actions is worth
encapsulating as a closed subroutine.
C. Branch Points and Information
One of the major problems in induction is what to do with
event sub-sequences which are similar but not identical. An
important solution is the use of branch points to allow some
elements of a sequence to be collapsed while others remain
distinct. For example, suppose that a system has been observed
to emit activities A, B, X, and Y, in the following sequence:
. . . A B X A B Y A B Y A B X A B Y A B X A B X A B X A B Y . . .
We might well represent this system by a finite-state device:
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Here, the state after the emission of B constitutes a branch
point, where the system "decides" whether to emit an X or a Y.
This use of the word "decides" is critically important. It is a
prime example of a behavioral imputation that need not correspond
to any mechanism actually used by the system that we are describing.
In other words, when our inductive analysis leads us to postulate
a branch point, we also postulate a decision process.
Furthermore, we inevitably go on to ask on what basis the
decision was made. We ask what information goes into determining
the choice at the branch point. For example, our finite-state
machine above becomes understandable if we assert that after
emitting a B, it reads a symbol off of a tape; if the symbol is
1, it emits an X, if it is 0, the machine emits a Y. Thus, we
identify the influence of information with (apparent) choice.
This is, of course, a fundamental intuition of formal information
theory; we see here that it is just as fundamental in understanding
the organization of behavior.
Sometimes it is the apparent seeking of information that
leads us to postulate a branch point, rather than the other way
around. For example, when we see a cat carefully scanning a ledge
before jumping onto it, we assume that he is deciding precisely
how he can execute the jump, if at all.
Although the postulation of branch points does not force a
hierarchical organization (as the finite-state representation
demonstrates), the two are very importantly related. One simple
way of seeing this is to think of a behavioral "parsing tree"
such as the following, for the sequence on the previous page:
-67-
Report No. 2316 Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
(The arc indicates an "AND" node; the lower node is an "OR"
node.) It is extremely convenient to imagine that there is some
entity, some decision process, associated at each branch point,
and that this entity "supervises" the activities that are found
below it. in the case of an "OR" branching, the supervisor of
course makes the decision of which branch should be taken. In
the case of an "AND" branching, the supervisor at least decides
when one phase should end and the next commence (which is sometimes
a non-trivial problem in complex systems like our robot).
We suspect that such postulated decision processes or super-
visors are the essence of behavioral representation. Certainly
our remaining sections will all revolve about this concept.
D. Spheres of Influence
Once we have postulated a hierarchy of supervisors, it is
natural to think of them in terms of the managerial structure of
a human organization. While there are a number of inadequacies
to this metaphor, it can be quite instructive. We think of a
human supervisor as having a certain "sphere of influence." This
includes the agents "below" him whose work he controls, and the
administrators above him who specify and evaluate his own work.
It is important to note that the supervisor's world, that is, his
sources of information, are local, being restricted to the nearby
realms above and below him. Of course, there is no precise
definition of "local"; what is important is that some information
is harder for the supervisor to come by than other information.
To give an important example, let us consider the case of a
man sitting in his living room watching t.v. who suddenly desires
a can of beer. At some peripherally conscious level, he realizes
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that he must get.up, go into the kitchen, and open the refrigerator
in order to' get a can of beer. In order to get up, he calls upon
a skilled activity involving placing bot°h feet on the floor,
bending forward at the waist, placing his hands on the arms of
the chair, etc. In order to place a foot on the floor, perhaps
specific neural circuits are used, containing internal feedback
loops to ensure smooth control of the muscles. Now, what interests
us is that the near-conscious supervisor has not the slightest
idea of how the muscles are moved, while the muscular circuits
have not the slightest idea of the desirability of beer. (By a
valid analogy, a corporation president and a laborer for the
corporation have no idea of each other's tasks.) Putting this in
terms of information and decisions, we can say that the near-
conscious planner is not capable of making any decisions on the
basis of signals from individual muscles, and the muscular control
circuits are not capable of making any choices based on needs or
knowledge involving beer.
Many of the hardest problems in designing the robot control
system arise from precisely such disjoint spheres of influence.
At one level the robot decides to look at a particular building,
but the eye was already being moved in the other direction for a
different reason, and besides the building in question is too far
behind the robot to be seen any more. Such problems of coordina-
tion are basic to any behavioral system which is sufficiently
ramified to contain supervisors with non-intersecting spheres of
influence. We will return to the matter of coordination after
examining one more fundamental notion.
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E. Goals
Perhaps the most tenuous concept involved in the description
of behavior is that of "goal". Even more than the other notions
that we have discussed, the idea of a "goal" is clearly a des-
criptive artifact. The desk calculator clunks along perfectly
well with no goals driving any of its gears or pinions. We have
found no single answer to the question of the proper role for the
concept of goals, but we are beginning to have some ideas as to
where it fits into the scheme of things.
If we consider our hierarchy of supervisors or executives,
we realize that the administrative tasks performed by these
entities (tasks such as keeping track of which subordinates are
doing what) are distinct from the overall task of the system.
That is, the manager of a steel mill pushes papers, but his
ultimate responsibility is to produce steel. We may suggest that
the notion of "goal" arises precisely when we have such a separa-
tion between an ultimate responsibility and the administrative
work required to meet that responsibility. In straightforward
behaving systems, where there is no such separation, we do not
need to postulate goals. For example, the engine of an automobile
drives the wheels, period — we do not need to say that it has
the goal of driving the wheels.
Of course, the designer of the automobile had the goal of
making the wheels go around, which is why he supplied the car
with an engine. For this reason, it does not sound nonsensical
to say that~the goal of the engine is to drive the wheels, but
in saying so we are merely including the human into the system
that we are describing. This would be made clearer by a careful
linguistic distinction: We should say that the purpose of the
engine is to drive the wheels; of itself, the engine has no goals.
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To take an example at the opposite end of the spectrum,
suppose that a man decides to discover a cure for cancer by next
February. Here we have the ultimate separation between the end
product of a system and the procedure for obtaining it, namely
there is no known procedure for obtaining it. In this case, the
only useful description of the man's behavior is in terms of a
goal.
We see, then, that the notion of goal is a function of the
way in which a behavior is described. We should be very careful
about postulating goals as a mechanism of the behavior itself.
This comment applies specifically to the new goal-oriented
programming languages, and to some of our own programming on the
robot simulation.
It is common to talk of goals in terms of states. Even in
terms of the cancer example, such a notion seems artificial: the
man's goal is to do something, namely discover a cure, not to be
in the state of having discovered a cure. Also, we may think of
organisms whose behavior is commonly described in terms of
tropisms: the worm's goal is to move toward water, away from
light. Here we may salvage the notion of state by speaking in
terms of gradients, but we should be aware that we are embalming
time- or space- derivatives in what is supposedly a static des-
cription. Thus, it is unduly restrictive to think of goals only
in terms of states.
Goals, too, are things that are desirable. What does this
mean? Perhaps it means that what a system wants, or what it wants
to do, defines its goals? A certain amount of programming experi-
ence or philosophical reflection will show that such an analysis
is tautological. We must admit that what a system does is
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identical with our (often post hoa) imputation of goals. However,
this identity does not render the concept of "desirability"
meaningless. We suspect that this concept can be usefully related
to that of expenditure of resources. Suppose that on a Sunday
a man has to choose between going fishing or mowing the lawn. We
observe him to be packing up his fishing gear. We then say that
he has selected the goal of doing some fishing, this being
(therefore) the more desirable alternative. If it had been
possible for the man to do both activities at the same time, the
description in terms of goals would have been much less useful.
Thus, ultimately the notion of goal brings us right back to the
notion of branching, of decision.
F. Resource Conflicts
As the foregoing discussion indicated, there is a close
connection between decisions and limitations of resources. If a
system had unlimited resources of all sorts, it would still have
to make decisions involving coordination (see the next two sections),
but many of its organizational problems would disappear. This is
strikingly clear in the case of our robot simulation, where much
of the subtlety arises from the fact that the robot is capable
of entertaining many simultaneous hypotheses about the world, but
it must check them out serially because of the focal nature of
V.1
visual attention. (This is not to imply that focal attention is
informationally inefficient; on the contrary, it is rich in
informational benefits, but these come at a high organizational
cost to the system that employs focal mechanisms.)
The resource limitation which is most familiar to computer
programmers is that of "processing power", i.e. the enforced
serial nature of most of our machines. When a process has "AND-ed"
subprocesses, we tend to think of them as sequential steps; when
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a process has "OR-ed" subprocesses, we worry about the order in
which they should be tried until one of them succeeds. It is
important to note that these primary concerns of the programmer
are in fact artifacts of serial processing in our computers (and
perhaps of serial analysis in our conscious thought). In human :
managerial systems, and in biological nervous systems, there is
ample opportunity for simultaneous activity among processes at
the same level. In such cases, the notions of "AND-ed" or "OR-ed"
subprocesses merge into each other, and we must find new bases for
describing the activity of the supervisor. The next two sections
will suggest some principles that may be useful.
An important fact about resource conflict is that it may
cut across the sphere-of-influence boundaries of individual local
supervisors. For example, in our robot simulation, no matter
what is the hierarchical relationship of various processes that
may wish to move the eye, there is only one eye, and all must
compete for it. It follows that the entity which allocates such
a resource cannot have its sphere of influence confined to any
sub-locality; therefore, it must become a global decision-maker.
This seems to us to be an extraordinarily powerful conclusion.
It seems to mean that a system, no matter how homogeneous its
elements (e.g. a nervous system), cannot have a homogeneous
behavioral structure if it contains conflict over resources.
There must be some mechanism which allows the attainment and
enforcement of a global decision as to the allocation of the
resource. We might even suggest that, according to this argument,
the appearance of a unitary "mind" is unavoidable (albeit at the
level of behavioral description) in any system with a high ratio
of potential behaviors to bodily resources.
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G. Condition Conflicts
More general than resource conflicts are the problems that
arise when two supervisors of independent subprocesses have
incompatible requirements as to the state of the world. To air
condition your house, the windows must be closed; to ventilate
it, they must be open; therefore you cannot do both at once.
tfn an algorithmically-behaving system, especially a
sequential one, the initial design of the system assures in
advance that the preconditions for a given subprocess will be met
at the time that the process is called for. The more adaptive a
system becomes, the more its organization must explicitly cope
with the meeting of preconditions before a subprocess can be
unleashed. Perhaps the ultimate of such organization is a collect-
ion of independent "demons", which are subprocesses that themselves
actively "monitor" their preconditions, and autonomously commence
their activity as soon as their conditions are met. This
"pandemonium" organization is powerful because of its inherent
parallelism, but in most cases it must be combined with some sort
of executive mechanism which will provide the requisite administra-
tive (global) control. In order to^ see how such hybrid organiza-
tions function, we must gain an understanding of some of the more
basic elements of the condition conflict problem.
We often think of "conditions" in terms of predicates which
are either true or false. There are a number of reasons why this
conception is inadequate. Many conditions (such as spatial
position) take on a range of values, which may well be continuous.
In many cases it is worthwhile to consider both the-value of
some measurable quantity (e.g. intensity of a stimulus) and its
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time-derivative; this complicates the specification of a
"condition" involving such a quantity. Often in real systems,
the value of a condition can be obtained only to some degree of
certainty less than 1.0 ; in such cases there must be a balance
between the overhead of ascertaining the condition and the chance
of making an erroneous decision. Even worse is the problem of
the possible variation in a condition over time. That is, the
system cannot afford to monitor all conditions at all times, but
conditions may have changed in the interval since they were last
observed (with some conditions being more likely to change than
others). This latter lias come to be known as the "frame problem";
clearly it implies that conditions must be assigned "expected
truth values", rather than being represented as predicates which
are either true or false.
These kinds of problems are compounded whenever the system
takes any overt actions, because then it produces some not-wholly-
predictable change in the world. In general, the possibility
that any one subprocess will change the preconditions for any
other (either favorably or unfavorably) can be computed only in
terms of expected probability, since a system has only a partial
knowledge of the world, and only limited time to spend predicting
the consequences of its actions. Of course, it is precisely this
sort of uncertainty which underlies the importance of sensory
feedback. If you want to know whether or not your elbow is rest-
ing in your coffee cup, don't figure it out — take a look. Or,
even better, have "passive" sensors which can interrupt an action
if it results in the placement of your elbow in the coffee.
The notion of interrupt relates back to the idea of a "demon"
silently watching until a certain condition is met, but it further
implies the power of one subprocess to halt or at least influence
another. Once this vital concept is allowed, our intuitive
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ability to comprehend the control organization of a complex
behavioral system goes from poor to abysmal. This is just the
point at which we would like to have a workable mathematical
representation, but at the moment we must be content with an
informal examination of the concepts that such a mathematics
must represent.
H. Temporal Organization
The problems of condition conflict can be looked at from a
temporal as well as from a logical point of view. In a sequential
system, each subprocess is invoked only when the previous one is
complete, at the behest of the administrating superprocess. In
a pandemonium system, the temporal interaction is more complex,
with the demons "waiting" in some kind of limbo status until they
get an opportunity to perform, perhaps interrupting some other
demons in the process. In all of this there is still one element
lacking: What sets the pace, what determines the global temporal
organization of events? This can be made into a fairly deep
question.
In many computer programs, the question of pace is totally
irrelevant. For example, suppose we are given the mathematical
2
relation X = (Y 4- 2*Z) . This relation is inherently atemporal.
Now consider a sequential program for computing X in terms of Y
and Z:
(1) X «- Z
(2) ...X «- 2*X .... .... . . . . . . . . _ . . . . .
(3) X «- Y + X
(4) X «• X*X
It does not matter how fast this program is run. All that matters
is that the steps be performed in order; this is what determines
the equivalence between the program and the formula.
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The situation is of course entirely different for a system
that must interact with the real world. If any one subprocess
has a temporal extension, then the others must be placed in some
temporal relationship to it. We can think of several ways of
achieving such temporal coordination, each with its advantages
and disadvantages. It is possible to define a global time-scale,
"clock time", against which all activities are mapped out. It
is possible to specify events in relative time; e.g., B happens
five seconds after A, but C is temporally independent. It is
possible to control a process in terms of the rate at which it
proceeds. And it is possible to regard time as one of the pre-
conditions to the commencement or branching of a process:
e.g. one subprocess could take a certain branch if another
subprocess had run for such-and-such a period, or if the clock
time were such-and-such. No one of these devices is adequate
for all purposes, and certainly all are used in effecting the
time-coordination of human affairs.
We feel that time is less understood relative to its
importance than any other aspect of behavioral organization.
This is especially true in regard to simultaneous processes,
which are just beginning to receive formal study. For example,
the notion of monitoring, and of the. supervision of one process
by another are most clearly exemplified when the supervisor and
the supervisee are functioning at the same time. Clearly this
and similar concepts are crucial to the organization of process
control.
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I. Executive Bookkeeping
One of the functions of a supervisor is to keep track of
what is going on among its subordinate processes. In current
programming systems, subprocesses are usually run sequentially,
they terminate of their own accord, and their success or failure
is evaluated only after they terminate. Even in so straight-
forward a case, the supervisor may require considerable bookkeeping
in order to keep track of what has and what has not been done.
The problem grows very complicated if the supervisor is to gain
anything from attempts which fail. There is the problem of
computing which portion of the acquired hard-knock experience
was a function of the particular approach that was tried, and
which experience is relevant to any further approach that might
be tried. Ultimately, this is a form of the frame problem,
solvable only by estimation.
The notions of "success" and "failure" should be treated
gingerly, since we would like to distinguish between goals which
are explicit to the supervisory process, versus those which are
implicit in the organization of the system (e.g., in our little
2
program for computing (Y + 2*Z) , all goals are implicit, and~the
supervisor has only to make sure that the steps are executed one
after the other, since they automatically "succeed" and
"terminate"). Of course, it is even harder to define when a
process is "succeeding" or "failing", in terms of a measure of
progress, yet this must be done in any system where processes
cannot be-expected to terminate themselves-automatically -(e.g..
the search for an item in a huge memory store).
The notion of "backtracking" in case of a failure is subject
to complexities, even in case failure is well-defined, and even
disregarding the problem of learning something from the failure.
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It presupposes that there is in fact a record somewhere of what
was being tried (this is not automatically the case in a
pandemonium-like system). Also, the problem of diagnosing where
to place responsibility for the failure may be effectively
insoluble in cases where the chain of command passes through
several disjoint spheres of influence. For example, if our
beer-seeking t.v. watcher finds that he cannot move his foot
(perhaps it is asleep), the analysis of the situation and
corrective action must be made at a very much higher level than
that at which the failure actually occurred. Thus, recovering
from a failure may be a challenging exercise both in bookkeeping
and decision-making finesse.
J. Executive Decision-Making
Given that the supervisor can keep track of what its sub-
ordinates are doing, in most systems it must allocate "processing
power" or some other resource to them on a merit basis. Presumably
the most meritorious course of action is that which will produce
the best or most results with the lowest expenditure of resource
(including time). Of course, the question is how the supervisor
is to know ahead of time, in a non-algorithm-like system, how to
estimate the effectiveness and expense of the various alternatives
that are presented to it. It is tricky to define how a supervisor
can predict or estimate the behavior of a subprocess without of
course carrying out the actual execution of the subprocess.
We should also mention that the very generation of alternative
subprocesses may be a task that consumes non-negligible resources.
For example, if the robot (or an animal) is confronted with a
visual scene, it must match that scene with long-term memory in
order to draw out hypotheses by which it may recognize parts of
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the scene. This match-search of memory is a major part of the
recognition process, and the system obviously cannot afford to
draw all possible hypotheses out of memory before testing any of
them. Thus, part of the executive responsibility is to generate
new potential subprocesses in a manner which is efficient, as
well as efficiently managing the subprocesses which have already
been proposed.
This sort of executive decision-making is perhaps the crux
of efficient behavior. At the same time, it is relatively simple
conceptually (if stated as a choice among alternatives), and
relatively well-studied by traditional means (e.g. statistical
decision theory). Therefore we will go no further into the
mechanisms of decision-making here, since our object is to consider
the structure of the behavioral system as a whole. And while it
might be relatively simple to enumerate the criteria for any
individual decision, it is usually not so simple to specify how
such decisions should interact, how supervisors should coordinate
and decide priority among themselves, what spheres of influence
should be open to each supervisor, and so forth.
K. Deciding the Overall Organization; Statistical Information
The question of overall organization, as we asserted in
Section VI.A, is one of optimizing with respect to certain goals,
whether one is describing a given behavioral system or designing
a new one. Thus, in many cases the finding of a good formalization
is substantially a different problem from the. finding .of any one.
that will work at all. The optimization must take into account
the system's behavior over a large class of similar inputs; that
is, it is essentially an inductive process. For example, suppose
that you are introduced to a person, and that he reacts moodily
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to your attempts to talk about football. From this one event,
you have no idea whether the problem is that he hates football,
or that he hates introductions, or that he was having a bad day,
or that he is generally a surly person. These possibilities can
be distinguished only by observing him in a number of similar
situations. It is easy to see that the same sort of procedure
is necessary for arriving at the proper description of any complex
behavioral system.
We would like to emphasize that the information gathered in
such experimentation with a behavioral system is statistical in
nature, and that therefore the selection of an optimum model of
a behavioral system is closely connected to the statistics of
its responses to typical inputs. This fact has been implicit in
everything we have said about alternative organizations of
systems. For example, if subprocess B is always both desirable
and possible after the execution of subprocess A, then the best
organization is to make them sequential steps under some larger
process. If the applicability of B depends on some particular
set of conditions, it might be best to provide a test of those
conditions, with the execution of B being dependent on this test.
If B is only rarely applicable, or if the circumstances of its
applicability are not readily predictable from tests, it might
be best to establish B as a "demon" which independently waits
and watches for its opportunity to proceed.
Thus, the proper organization of a particular behavior is
entirely dependent on the particular statistical peculiarities
of the task at hand. This is true of the global organization,
and of the details of control throughout the system. Furthermore,
there are some problems, such as the handling of the "frame
problem" mentioned in Section VI.G., which have solutions only
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in terms of a statistical conformity of the system to its
informational environment. Perhaps this ubiquitous influence
of the statistical properties of the task is the most important
general principle that can be stated about the organization of
behavioral systems.
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